Up to now, this is just a question of likelihood concept
By substitution inside (1), i’ve:
That it exemplory case of Bayes’ Theorem works together kissbridesdate.com go to this web-site with the simple situation in which you’ve got a couple of hypotheses H and you can J which can be mutually personal and together thorough, and in which one is looking for \(\Pr(H \middle E)\), that is, your chances that H holds true considering facts E. Exactly what that it instance of Bayes’ Theorem does try render that with a way of calculating you to likelihood, so long as that knows, firstly, \(\Pr(H)\) and you may \(\Pr(J)\)-which is, the an effective priori logical possibilities of \(H\) and you may \(J\)-and then have, 2nd, \(\Pr(Elizabeth \mid H)\) and you will \(\Pr(Elizabeth \mid J)\)-that’s, new logical likelihood of \(E\) given, respectively, just \(H\) and only \(J\).
Nevertheless now Draper raises a couple of substantive says. The first is your a good priori odds of the newest hypothesis of indifference isnt less than brand new an effective priori odds of theism, so i’ve